Professor Avinash Persaud discusses the ramifications of being and becoming the World’s Dominant Currency, and what it means for the euro, the renminibi and other world currencies to try to take over that status from the dollar.
I SPENT THE first part of my career as a currency strategist in the City of London. One of the nice things about being a currency forecaster is that expectations of you are very low. Moderate success is a great surprise. But there are a few things that are more certain than others.
For example, at any one time, there tends to be a single dominant currency in the financial world — not two or more, just one. Some people believe that while the euro may not topple the dollar, it will at least share the spoils of financial hegemony. History suggests not. In the currency markets, the spoils go to the victor, alone — they are not shared.
Either the euro succeeds internationally, or it does not. (Which, lest I anger my Europhile friends, does not make it a failure, just not an international currency widely accepted outside the euro area. Many countries have credible, stable currencies that are not international currencies, such as Canada, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Japan, and Sweden.)
In the past, it was worth asking what the spoils are to being an international or reserve currency.
Some countries deliberately tried to avoid their currency becoming internationalized, such as postwar Germany. The Bundesbank felt that the more deutsche marks that were held outside of Germany, the less control they would have over money supply and monetary conditions. European aspirations for the euro to become the world’s reserve currency are more French than German, more dirigiste than dirigisme.
Today, the spoils of reserve currency status are more clearly visible than ever before. If your currency is a reserve currency, you can pay for things by writing checks, which nobody cashes. You can spend more than you earn to a far greater extent than anyone else. This is exactly what the United States has done in recent years. National expenditure has exceeded national income by more than 20% over the last five years.
The World’s Dominant currency Going Broke on Tanks and Pills
When that excess spending was due to investment in technology in the late 1990s, it was not clear whether the United States was benefiting from being a reserve currency, or whether it was simply enjoying an investment boom.
But today, that excess spending is on unproductive consumption: tanks, bullets, and pills. Few countries in the past have ever been able to sustain a deficit on external accounts as large as that in the United States today. And when other countries have run large deficits, they have had to pay significant premiums to borrow the money, not as in the case of the United States today, receiving a discount. These are some of the immediate advantages of being a reserve currency.
International and reserve currency status also lends the host country even greater influence than otherwise. One of the interesting passages of dollar diplomacy in recent years was in early 1998, when Japan and Singapore were both generously putting up the cash to support the East Asian economies amid the Asian financial crisis, but the U.S. Treasury was dictating the terms.
The World’s Dominant Currency: Self-Perpetuating Ubiquity: For Today, the Dollar is Microsoft
There are good reasons why there is seldom more than one dominant currency. Reserve currencies have the attributes of a natural monopoly, or, in more modern parlance, a network. If it costs extra to trade with someone who uses a different currency than you, it makes sense for you to use the currency that most other people use. This makes that currency yet bigger and cheaper to use. There is a good analogy with a computer operating system. In that world, Windows is the dollar.
This networking power is why central banks store dollars in their reserves in a far greater proportion than the proportion of trade with the United States. While 30% of international trade is with the United States, 70% of central bank reserves are in dollars. It is why most commodities, like oil, copper, and coffee, are priced in dollars, wherever they are found and whomever they are sold to.
Something else we can be more certain of is that reserve currencies come and go. They don’t last forever. International currencies in the past have included the Chinese liang and the Greek drachma, coined in the fifth century B.C.; the silver punch-marked coins of fourth-century India; the Roman denari; the Byzantine solidus and Islamic dinar of the Middle Ages; the Venetian ducato of the Renaissance; the 17th-century Dutch guilder; and, of course, sterling — and now the dollar.
A necessary condition of a currency becoming a reserve currency appears to be its breadth of use and cost and ease of transaction, not, as some might think, the ability to hold its value. Clearly, hyperinflation would not serve a reserve currency, and the end of reserve currency status is often associated with a cycle of inflation. But within the normal bands of inflation, it is size as a trader that matters. In the long term, the Swiss franc and the yen have been better stores of value than the dollar. Since 1980, they have appreciated by more than 21% and 54% versus the dollar, respectively. Yet for much of this time, combined, they have represented no more than 10% of central bank reserves.
In the 18th century, Britain was the largest economy of the Western world, London was the center of international trade and finance, the currency was convertible, and so sterling became the world’s reserve currency. By the late 19th century, the United States had become the world’s largest economy, a position solidified by Europe’s repeated attempt at self-annihilation from the 1880s to the 1940s. By the 1960s, the dollar had usurped sterling and was the world’s new reserve currency, with 60% of total central bank reserves being held in dollars, twice the level of sterling reserves.
The World’s Dominant Currency: Tomorrow, the Renminbi Will Crush the Dollar
But time doesn’t stop. By the mid-21st century, the United States will no longer be the world’s largest economy. By then, China and India will have overtaken the United States, Western Europe and Japan, on purchasing power parity terms at least, which should represent where exchange rates are likely to be in the long run. Indeed, optimistic measures of sustainable growth in China and India suggest this will be the case in 20 years time. Ladies and gentlemen, within my lifetime, the dollar will start to lose its reserve currency status, not to the euro, but to the renminbi.
The process is likely to be long and drawn out, rather like sterling’s slip and slide. Although the United Kingdom had lost its position of the world’s largest economy in the late 19th century, by 1928, it was still the world’s major reserve currency, with twice as many central bank reserves being held in sterling than in dollars. In part, this slow process was a result of the authorities’ attempts to delay it.
Gaining reserve currency status is heaven, as you write checks and no one cashes them. Losing reserve currency status is hell, as everyone starts to cash all the checks you ever wrote back in time. Britain’s economic history and politics for the first three quarters of the last century were dominated by the overhang of sterling balances and the pressure on sterling as these were liquidated.
The principal way in which Britain tried to slow the process was through the use of imperial power and influence. By the 1930s, sterling’s reserve currency status was largely a result of sterling balances held by the British colonies. The majority of sterling reserves were held by Ireland, India, Pakistan, and Australia, not the major economies of the time, the United States, France, Germany, or Japan. In the postwar period, the British authorities formalized the sterling area, within which there were few restrictions to trade but strict rules controlling the movement of goods and capital into and out of the bloc. One could argue that sterling had already lost its reserve currency status in the sense of a currency that third parties voluntarily choose to use as a vehicle currency. However, there is no reason to suppose that the United States would not follow a new imperialism by exerting pressure on countries to stick to the dollar bloc.
There are three further implications of this analysis.
First, those Europeans who want the euro to become the major international currency must consider either substantial immigration or an aggressive enlargement eastward. A European Union that by 2025 included the former Soviet bloc, Turkey, and North Africa could rival the dollar and renminbi, especially if the process brought greater political stability to the new member states.
Second, the loss of reserve currency status for the United States will bring economic and political crisis. If it was economically and politically painful for the United Kingdom, even though its international financial position was not in heavy deficit, what will it be for the United States, which has become the world’s largest debtor? There will be an avalanche of checks coming home to be paid when the dollar begins to lose its status. Of course, excessive debt in your own currency is also spelled “inflation.” That is the most likely outcome, and it is how other governments have tried to cope with the loss of reserve status in the past. The solidus and dinari were ultimately consumed by a cycle of inflation and debasement.
Third, if the renminbi is to become a major reserve currency, it first has to leave the dollar bloc. This will happen later rather than sooner. One of the other certainties in foreign exchange, what I call the Second Rule of Foreign Exchange, is that the smaller, more open an economy is, the more the authorities manage the exchange rate, and similarly, the larger, more closed an economy is, the less the authorities care about the exchange rate.
Policymakers perceive a trade-off, at least over the course of the political cycle, between the economic flexibility afforded by a floating exchange rate that can respond to new and varying circumstances and the economic disruption that a volatile exchange rate, sensitive to external factors, factors often beyond the control of the country, can cause.
This potential disruption is greatest the more open an economy is to international trade. Small open economies opt for inflexible exchange rates. Large closed economies prefer to keep the flexibility of a floating rate. The European Monetary Union (EMU) makes political economy sense for Belgium, but not for the United States.
The World’s Dominant Currency: From Pegged to Floating, China Emergeth
We think of China as a vast country with a growing economy, but in many ways, it has the characteristics of a small open economy today, with the market sectors of the economy being led, driven, and dependent on international trade. Although I am not altogether comfortable about the meaning of some of the national statistics in a command economy, for what they are worth, they suggest that in terms of trade as a percent of GDP, China is far more open than the United States or euroland, countries that pursue exchange rate flexibility, and is more akin to France, Spain, and Korea, countries that choose exchange rate management. The current arrangement, therefore, is likely to persist for a while longer.
That does not mean that there will not be a revaluation of the renminbi shortly — it could even happen around the end of this year — but that the Chinese will revalue the renminbi and stick to a pegged system, though the limits may widen a little from the current 1%.
But a dollar peg is not China’s destiny. It may have an open economy today, but longer term, China will be a large economy, driven by its domestic, rather than external, sector. Then, it will prefer a more flexible exchange rate. The decision by China to move from a peg to a float will mark the beginning of the end of the dollar’s reserve currency status. You can see why the Chinese were invited for dinner by the G-7 in September.
In summary, there are few, if any, instances of a single financial system having more than one key currency. Today, that currency is unquestionably the dollar. But reserve currencies come and go. Perhaps the immediate economic advantages that they bestow seduce governments to overextend themselves until the financial empire collapses upon itself. The collapse, as a couple generations of unpaid checks are presented to be paid, will push the United States into a series of economic and political crises in the middle of the 21st century.
The most likely candidate to replace the dollar is not the euro, unless Europe embraces rapid eastward expansion; it is China. Through rapid economic growth and a massive population, China will become the largest economy within 20 years time, and economic size is the key to the rise of new financial empires.
The principal risks to this forecast are whether China can continue growing rapidly and, more uncertain, whether it can maintain a degree of political stability. If Chinese leadership fails on both fronts, the dollar’s reign will probably last a little longer. There is a possibility that it finds itself under threat from another quarter, the rupee. India’s democracy is remarkably stable for a poor country. Moreover, courtesy of the one child policy, it is India, not China that will end up with the largest population in the world by 2050. The fate of the average Chinese today is to grow old before they grow rich; the fate of the average American is more uncertain than most imagine.
January 3, 2005
Whiskey & Gunpowder occasionally features commentary from financial analysts, experts, gold bugs and an array of contributors from various fields and occupations. Their diverse insights and contrarians investing ideas are hand selected by your Whiskey & Gunpowder editors.
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