From Empty Stockpiles to Explosive Profits

One of the persistent debates surrounding the war with Iran concerns the amount of weapons the United States has launched, either in attacking Iran or defending U.S. bases against Iranian attacks.

The question of how many weapons have been used segues into how many weapons remain in U.S. inventories. If those remaining inventories are low, that calls into question the ability of the U.S. to sustain the war in Iran and respond to attacks in hot spots around the world.

President Trump claims that the U.S. has ample weapons to continue the war and meet new threats. That claim is dubious. The truth is that arsenals are almost totally depleted in some cases and dangerously low in others.

Hard data is hard to come by, but we have been able to obtain reasonably accurate figures from sources in the Pentagon and from the weapons manufacturers themselves.

Here’s a summary of the key weapons systems now in short supply, including the quantities requested to replenish U.S. arsenals, anticipated deliveries, annual production capacity and estimated timelines for returning inventories to prewar levels:

• Tomahawk Cruise Missiles: Over 1,000 missiles have been used in Iran to date. The Pentagon’s request for new missiles for fiscal year 2027 is 785 missiles. Anticipated deliveries in fiscal year 2026 are 207. Annual production capacity is between 600 and 1,000 missiles, although the lower figure is more realistic. Inventories at a level prior to the war in Iran are not expected to be achieved until late 2030 or early 2031.

• Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Missiles (THAAD): Approximately 290 missiles have been used in Iran to date. The Pentagon’s request for new missiles for fiscal year 2027 is 857 missiles. Anticipated deliveries in fiscal year 2026 are 92. Annual production capacity is between 96 and 400 missiles, although the lower figure is more realistic. Inventories at a level prior to the war in Iran are not expected to be achieved until late 2029.

• Patriot Interceptor Air Defense Missiles: Approximately 1,430 missiles have been used in Iran to date. The Pentagon’s request for new missiles for fiscal year 2027 is 3,203 missiles. Anticipated deliveries in fiscal year 2026 are 172. Annual production capacity is approximately 2,000 missiles. Inventories at a level prior to the war in Iran are not expected to be achieved until mid-2029.

• RIM-161 Standard Missile 3 (SM-3): A system meant to destroy incoming ballistic missiles in space — approximately 250 missiles have been used in Iran to date. The Pentagon’s request for new missiles for fiscal year 2027 is 214 missiles. Anticipated deliveries in fiscal year 2026 are 52. Annual production capacity is between 156 to 250 missiles, although the lower figure is more realistic. Inventories at a level prior to the war in Iran are not expected to be achieved until early 2029.

• RIM-174 Standard Missile 6 (SM-6): A system meant to destroy incoming aircraft and missiles that can also strike ships — approximately 370 missiles have been used in Iran to date. The Pentagon’s request for new missiles for fiscal year 2027 is 540 missiles. Anticipated deliveries in fiscal year 2026 are 125. Annual production capacity is about 240 to 500 missiles, although the lower figure is more realistic. Inventories at a level prior to the war in Iran are not expected to be achieved until late 2028 or early 2029.

• AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM): A cruise missile that can be launched by U.S. Air Force aircraft from a safe distance (standoff) — approximately 1,100 missiles have been used in Iran to date. The Pentagon’s request for new missiles for fiscal year 2027 is 821 missiles. Anticipated deliveries in fiscal year 2026 are 484. Annual production capacity is about 860 missiles. Inventories at a level prior to the war in Iran are not expected to be achieved until mid-2027.

• Precision Strike Missile (PrSM): A new surface-to-surface attack missile — approximately 70 missiles have been used in Iran to date. The Pentagon’s request for new missiles for fiscal year 2027 is 1,134 missiles. Anticipated deliveries in fiscal year 2026 are 70. Annual production capacity is around 680 missiles. Inventories at a level prior to the war in Iran are not expected to be achieved until late 2026.

This data is focused on the most important weapons systems the U.S. uses in Iran, including cruise missiles, anti-missiles and attack missiles.

It does not include other, more mundane but equally important data, including global shortages of 155mm artillery shells. Those shells are not being used in Iran, but they are critical weapons used on the front lines in Ukraine.

The Pentagon’s Math Doesn’t Add Up

Some key facts should jump out at us based on these figures.

The first is the gap between weapons requested by the Pentagon for 2027 compared to the amount of weapons anticipated for delivery in 2026. Requests for Patriot missiles in 2027 are almost 20 times anticipated deliveries this year. Requests for THAAD missiles in 2027 are over nine times anticipated deliveries this year. Requests for PrSM missiles in 2027 are over 16 times anticipated deliveries this year. Similar high ratios prevail for the other systems.

This ratio casts considerable doubt on the ability of weapons manufacturers to meet the Pentagon’s requests. It is true that output is increasing, but these weapons systems are highly sophisticated and therefore sensitive in terms of electronic components, guidance systems, radar seekers and other features that make them effective.

Expanding production is not nearly as easy as expanding output on an automobile assembly line. Some of the work is almost artisanal.

There is also a gross mismatch between the weapons requested and actual production capacity. Patriot missiles requested are 160% of estimated capacity. THAAD missiles requested are almost 900% of current capacity if the lower capacity estimate is used.

This mismatch explains why many of the inventory goals will not be met until 2029 or later. And even those 2029 estimates do not make allowance for expanded attacks in Iran or new wars elsewhere.

The U.S. is dealing from a position of weakness in terms of key weapons systems inventories. Loud claims from the White House won’t change that.

Ukraine’s Bill Comes Due

The biggest disgrace is that our arsenals would not be this depleted if we had not committed so many weapons to Ukraine.

We wrote from the start of that war in 2022 that Russia would win and that Ukraine was a corrupt state with a serious neo-Nazi problem. Those forecasts reflected our assessment of the war from the beginning. The end game is now in play, with Russia pressing its campaign in eastern Ukraine and along the Black Sea coast.

The Patriot missiles and other systems supplied to Ukraine have added to the pressure on U.S. inventories and production capacity. Not all of those weapons came from existing U.S. stocks, and Ukraine is not the only reason inventories are so low now that we are fighting in Iran.

But the allocation of scarce weapons among competing theaters is precisely the problem Washington should have anticipated.

The White House has invoked the Defense Production Act to remove legal, logistical and supply chain obstacles to expanded weapons production. Of course, the situation would not be so dire if Obama and Biden had not spent their twelve years in office running down the military capability of the United States.

Trump could not do much to reverse the situation in his first term because of the Russiagate Hoax and two impeachments led by Democrats. Now, in Trump’s second term, things are beginning to change for the better.

Eight Defense Giants, One Massive Rebuild

The biggest defense contractors in the U.S. (known as the Big Eight) are Lockheed Martin, RTX (formerly Raytheon), General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, L3Harris, HII (formerly Huntington Ingalls Industries) and Leidos.

Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor on THAAD, JASSM and the PrSM strike missile. RTX is the prime contractor on the Tomahawk cruise missile, the Patriot air-defense system, the SM-3 and the SM-6. HII builds nuclear aircraft carriers and submarines.

Northrop Grumman builds the B-2 stealth bomber and is a major partner on the F-35 advanced fighter jet. L3Harris specializes in advanced telecommunications, electronic warfare, night vision capabilities and rocket motors.

Leidos works closely with the intelligence community on cyber operations and mission software. General Dynamics builds the M1 Abrams battle tank and nuclear-powered submarines. Boeing’s space and defense units focus on fighter jets, helicopters and space and satellite systems.

Beyond the Big Eight, other large defense contractors include SAIC, Booz Allen, Textron, SpaceX, Palantir, Anduril and General Atomics. As the Pentagon replenishes its arsenals and invests in new technologies, contracts will flow to both established manufacturers and newer companies.

The Next Defense Boom Starts Here

The dire state of U.S. inventories of weapons systems, as well as the obsolescence of many front-line systems, is a national disgrace.

Patriot air-defense systems can shoot down cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, but the growing threat from advanced hypersonic weapons presents new challenges. Russia has repeatedly targeted Patriot systems in Ukraine, underscoring the vulnerability of expensive air-defense assets to modern missile attacks.

That said, out of past failures come new opportunities.

The Pentagon is determined both to replenish inventories and to build new systems that are better suited to the age of AI, drone swarms and hypersonics. Investors looking to lighten up on the AI boom exposures might consider the defense sector as the next big thing.