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		<title>The Art of Short-Selling</title>
		<link>http://dailyreckoning.com/the-art-of-short-selling/</link>
		<comments>http://dailyreckoning.com/the-art-of-short-selling/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 09 Aug 2005 14:51:35 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[James Chanos is a famous short-seller at Kynikos Associates in New York, the firm he founded in 1985. Chanos got a lot of press for his accurate bearish call on Enron several years ago. There are few better at the business of betting on stock price declines than Chanos, who has been at this a [...]<p><a href="http://dailyreckoning.com/the-art-of-short-selling/">The Art of Short-Selling</a> originally appeared in the <a href="http://www.facebook.com/TheDailyReckoning">Daily Reckoning</a>. The Daily Reckoning, published by <a href="http://www.facebook.com/AgoraFinancial">Agora Financial</a> provides over 400,000 global readers economic news, market analysis, and contrarian investment ideas. </p>
]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span class="Normal"><span class="Normal">James Chanos is a famous short-seller at Kynikos Associates </span><br />
<span class="Normal">in New York, the firm he founded in 1985. Chanos got a lot </span><br />
<span class="Normal">of press for his accurate bearish call on Enron several </span><br />
<span class="Normal">years ago. There are few better at the business of betting </span><br />
<span class="Normal">on stock price declines than Chanos, who has been at this a </span><br />
<span class="Normal">long time.</span><br />
<span class="Normal"> </span><br />
<span class="Normal">I recently finished reading an interview with Chanos in </span><br />
<span class="Normal">Value Investor Insight, and I&#8217;d like to share with you some </span><br />
<span class="Normal">of his best ideas. What follows is a summary of his three </span><br />
<span class="Normal">favorite situations – broad categories in which he has </span><br />
<span class="Normal">found good short candidates.  I think you will find this </span><br />
<span class="Normal">schematic useful in your own trading and thinking. We&#8217;ll </span><br />
<span class="Normal">also take a look at three of his current favorite trades, </span><br />
<span class="Normal">one of which I recently recommended to the subscribers of </span><br />
<span class="Normal">my Crisis Point Trader.</span><br />
<span class="Normal"> </span><br />
<span class="Normal">First, the doomsday categories&#8230;</span><br />
<span class="Normal"> </span><br />
<strong>Booms That Go Bust</strong> <span class="Normal"> </span><br />
<span class="Normal"> </span><br />
<span class="Normal">Chanos cited this as his most lucrative field of </span><br />
<span class="Normal">operations: great booms that then go bust. But, he offered </span><br />
<span class="Normal">an important caveat on which ones to play. Specifically, he </span><br />
<span class="Normal">has found great success with &quot;debt-financed asset bubbles&quot; </span><br />
<span class="Normal">as opposed to those driven strictly by investor mania. The </span><br />
<span class="Normal">former are ticking time bombs, where you are betting on the </span><br />
<span class="Normal">inevitable, whereas the latter are simply plays on </span><br />
<span class="Normal">excessive valuation reverting to some more normal number. </span><br />
<span class="Normal">&quot;My biggest mistakes have generally been because I stayed </span><br />
<span class="Normal">in things just because they were expensive,&quot; he admits, </span><br />
<span class="Normal">&quot;&#8230;valuations can be crazy and stay crazy.&quot;</span><br />
<span class="Normal"> </span><br />
<span class="Normal">The ongoing housing bubble is one example of a debt-</span><br />
<span class="Normal">financed asset bubble. But Chanos is not shorting </span><br />
<span class="Normal">homebuilders. They are making money and are in good shape </span><br />
<span class="Normal">financially. It is the consumer, Chanos notes, who will </span><br />
<span class="Normal">suffer the most when the bubble runs its course. </span><br />
<span class="Normal"> </span><br />
<span class="Normal">In today&#8217;s market, this intrepid short-seller sees a debt-</span><br />
<span class="Normal">financed bubble in Chinese manufacturing. &quot;Plants are being </span><br />
<span class="Normal">built with debt for which return on capital will be very </span><br />
<span class="Normal">low,&quot; he says. Since economies are prone to fits and </span><br />
<span class="Normal">starts, and even the brisk Chinese manufacturers will </span><br />
<span class="Normal">endure periods of slowdown and excess capacity, these debts </span><br />
<span class="Normal">are a threatening overhang. On the low margins Chinese </span><br />
<span class="Normal">manufacturers typically earn, they have little cushion </span><br />
<span class="Normal">against adversity.</span><br />
<span class="Normal"> </span><br />
<span class="Normal">Another area Chanos thinks is an asset bubble in the making </span><br />
<span class="Normal">is in the steel industry. Steel capacity has grown 30-40% </span><br />
<span class="Normal">over the past few years, and the soaring steel prices have </span><br />
<span class="Normal">come down significantly from the $780 highs achieved in </span><br />
<span class="Normal">September 2004 (for a ton of hot rolled band). Currently </span><br />
<span class="Normal">around $400 (keep in mind, this industry lost money on $300 </span><br />
<span class="Normal">steel prices in 2003), analysts are projecting $500-600 </span><br />
<span class="Normal">steel prices going forward. Chanos believes the industry&#8217;s </span><br />
<span class="Normal">overcapacity issues will make that a hard price to sustain. </span><br />
<span class="Normal"> </span><br />
<strong>Technological Obsolescence &#8211; Victims of &quot;Creative<br />
Destruction&quot;<br />
</strong> <span class="Normal"> </span><br />
<span class="Normal">Economist Joseph Schumpeter gave us the phrase &quot;creative </span><br />
<span class="Normal">destruction&quot; to describe the process of new companies and </span><br />
<span class="Normal">technologies destroying and replacing older or obsolete </span><br />
<span class="Normal">ones. Disruptive technologies can wipe out entire </span><br />
<span class="Normal">industries and render old products worthless.</span><br />
<span class="Normal"> </span><br />
<span class="Normal">This competitive process is ongoing. Chanos cites the </span><br />
<span class="Normal">transformation happening now as we move from an analog to a </span><br />
<span class="Normal">digital world. &quot;While this has created great fortunes like </span><br />
<span class="Normal">Google&#8217;s,&quot; Chanos notes, &quot;it&#8217;s also wiping out whole </span><br />
<span class="Normal">businesses.&quot;</span><br />
<span class="Normal"> </span><br />
<span class="Normal">Traditional music retailing was one of the first to start </span><br />
<span class="Normal">disappearing, and now Chanos sees the same thing happening </span><br />
<span class="Normal">with video rental, as movie studios sell directly to </span><br />
<span class="Normal">retailers such as Wal-Mart, not to mention the rise of </span><br />
<span class="Normal">video-on-demand products. </span><br />
<span class="Normal"> </span><br />
<strong>Consumer Fads That Go Flat</strong> <span class="Normal"> </span><br />
<span class="Normal"> </span><br />
<span class="Normal">The last of the trio, Chanos has also found success betting </span><br />
<span class="Normal">against consumer fads – the more obvious examples would be </span><br />
<span class="Normal">Cabbage Patch Kids in the 1980s, NordicTrack in the early </span><br />
<span class="Normal">1990s and the Foreman Grill more recently.</span><br />
<span class="Normal"> </span><br />
<span class="Normal">In these situations, Chanos is looking to capitalize on the </span><br />
<span class="Normal">all-too-human error of taking the present and extrapolating </span><br />
<span class="Normal">it into the future. Investors are generally overly </span><br />
<span class="Normal">optimistic about the prospects of faddish products.</span><br />
<span class="Normal"> </span><br />
<span class="Normal">Today, he is short Palm, the makers of the popular PDAs. </span><br />
<span class="Normal">Palm, however, loses money on their PDAs and they don&#8217;t </span><br />
<span class="Normal">produce the software that makes the system go. &quot;The biggest </span><br />
<span class="Normal">problem is that Palm doesn&#8217;t control the Treo software – </span><br />
<span class="Normal">it&#8217;s just a box,&quot; Chanos says. &quot;Boxes with chips in them </span><br />
<span class="Normal">tend to be very good shorts if that&#8217;s all they have.&quot;</span><br />
<span class="Normal"> </span><br />
<span class="Normal">An example of a box with software is the popular </span><br />
<span class="Normal">Blackberries produced by Research In Motion. The Blackberry </span><br />
<span class="Normal">runs on Research In Motion software, which could become the </span><br />
<span class="Normal">standard and then you have &quot;a monster on your hands.&quot;</span><br />
<span class="Normal"> </span><br />
<strong>More Insights From A Great Short Seller</strong> <span class="Normal"> </span><br />
<span class="Normal"> </span><br />
<span class="Normal">Add any accounting irregularities to the above and you have </span><br />
<span class="Normal">a potential big winner on the short side.</span><br />
<span class="Normal"> </span><br />
<span class="Normal">As to mitigating risks, Chanos says there are two basic </span><br />
<span class="Normal">methods: position-sizing and stop losses. He favors the use </span><br />
<span class="Normal">of position limits of no more than 5% on his portfolio and </span><br />
<span class="Normal">he cuts back on ideas that move against him. As for </span><br />
<span class="Normal">mechanical stop losses, Chanos is philosophically opposed </span><br />
<span class="Normal">to using them: &quot;We&#8217;ve never used stop losses. We feel like </span><br />
<span class="Normal">having a mechanical rule that takes you out of positions </span><br />
<span class="Normal">regardless of the fundamentals makes no sense.&quot; </span><br />
<span class="Normal"> </span><br />
<span class="Normal">While we prefer to buy puts on stocks that we think will </span><br />
<span class="Normal">decline, there are obvious parallels between short-selling </span><br />
<span class="Normal">and put-buying – they are both bets on stocks taking a </span><br />
<span class="Normal">dive. Therefore, it can be useful to study the art of </span><br />
<span class="Normal">short-selling to improve your ability to detect blow-ups </span><br />
<span class="Normal">and collapses. (In fact, such studies will help you on the </span><br />
<span class="Normal">long side as well, helping you avoid potential craters.) </span><br />
<span class="Normal">For more reading on short-selling, there are few good </span><br />
<span class="Normal">resources. The best is Kathryn Staley&#8217;s The Art of Short </span><br />
<span class="Normal">Selling. Also, Manuel Asensio&#8217;s Sold Short is a good read </span><br />
<span class="Normal">and let&#8217;s you into the mind of another long-term successful </span><br />
<span class="Normal">short seller.</span><br />
<span class="Normal"> </span><br />
<span class="Normal">Now, let&#8217;s take a look at Chanos&#8217; investment ideas. First, </span><br />
<span class="Normal">in the category of &quot;Victims of Creative Destruction,&quot; we </span><br />
<span class="Normal">have Eastman Kodak (EK). In Chanos&#8217; worldview, we are </span><br />
<span class="Normal">moving from an analog to a digital world and the </span><br />
<span class="Normal">consequences of that are being felt by a variety of </span><br />
<span class="Normal">businesses. Chanos believes Kodak is another Polaroid, a </span><br />
<span class="Normal">company that is slowly being eaten alive by the </span><br />
<span class="Normal">competition. Their most profitable business has </span><br />
<span class="Normal">traditionally been film. Now, even professionals are moving </span><br />
<span class="Normal">to digital.</span><br />
<span class="Normal"> </span><br />
<span class="Normal">The business is in decline. Free cash flow was $1.5 billion </span><br />
<span class="Normal">in 2002, $1 billion in 2003 and only $500 million last </span><br />
<span class="Normal">year. This year, Kodak may not generate any free cash flow. </span><br />
<span class="Normal">Plus, it is spending billions of dollars on acquisitions </span><br />
<span class="Normal">every year in the pursuit of elusive profits in digital </span><br />
<span class="Normal">products. The company is also saddled with some large </span><br />
<span class="Normal">retirement-benefit costs.</span><br />
<span class="Normal"> </span><br />
<span class="Normal">Another short candidate is Fairfax Financial Holdings </span><br />
<span class="Normal">(FFH). &quot;We think this is a zero,&quot; Chanos said. Basically, </span><br />
<span class="Normal">this Canadian property &amp; casualty company grew aggressively </span><br />
<span class="Normal">with acquisitions in the 1990s. Today, it runs a chronic </span><br />
<span class="Normal">underwriting deficit. It is also one of the biggest players </span><br />
<span class="Normal">in finite reinsurance – the stuff that Spitzer is on a </span><br />
<span class="Normal">rampage about. Fairfax is highly leveraged and heavily </span><br />
<span class="Normal">under-reserved. The earnings quality, Chanos believes, is </span><br />
<span class="Normal">poor. </span><br />
<span class="Normal"> </span><br />
<span class="Normal">Unfortunately, Fairfax Financial is a relatively illiquid </span><br />
<span class="Normal">stock with a very illiquid option market. So that makes the </span><br />
<span class="Normal">stock even more dangerous than the average short-sale </span><br />
<span class="Normal">candidate. Nevertheless, Kodak and Fairfax are both very </span><br />
<span class="Normal">interesting ideas. But I found Chanos&#8217; third idea to be the </span><br />
<span class="Normal">most compelling, which is why I recently recommended a </span><br />
<span class="Normal">bearish position on the stock to the subscribers of my </span><br />
<span class="Normal">CrisisPoint Trader. I&#8217;d love to tell you the whys and </span><br />
<span class="Normal">wherefores of this idea, as well as the exact strategy we </span><br />
<span class="Normal">are using, but that information is for subscribers only. </span> </span></p>
<div><span class="Normal"><span class="Normal"><strong>And the Markets&#8230;</strong> </span> </span></div>
<p><span class="Normal"></span></p>
<table border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="500">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td width="187" valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td width="97" valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">Monday</span></p>
</td>
<td width="96" valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">Friday</span></p>
</td>
<td width="112" valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">This week</span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">Year-to-Date</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">DOW </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">10,537 </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">10,610 </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">-104</span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">-2.3%</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">S&amp;P</span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">1,223 </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">1,236 </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">-11</span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">0.9%</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">NASDAQ</span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">2,164 </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">2,191 </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">-20</span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">-0.5%</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">10-year Treasury</span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">4.42%</span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">4.31%</span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">0.14</span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">0.21</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">30-year Treasury</span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">4.60%</span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">4.52%</span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">0.12</span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">-0.23</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">Russell 2000</span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">660 </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">672 </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">-20</span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">1.2%</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">Gold</span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">$434.80 </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">$437.75 </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">$5.30</span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">-0.6%</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">Silver</span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">$7.02 </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">$7.20 </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">-$0.21</span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">3.0%</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">CRB</span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">318.25 </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">315.73 </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">6.25</span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">12.1%</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">WTI NYMEX CRUDE</span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">$63.94 </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">$61.38 </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">$3.37</span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">47.2%</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">Yen (YEN/USD)</span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">JPY 112.14 </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">JPY 111.33 </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">0.30</span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">-9.3%</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">Dollar (USD/EUR)</span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">$1.2353 </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">$1.2379 </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">-226</span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">8.9%</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">Dollar (USD/GBP)</span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">$1.7849 </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">$1.7800 </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">-273</span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">7.0%</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p><a href="http://dailyreckoning.com/the-art-of-short-selling/">The Art of Short-Selling</a> originally appeared in the <a href="http://www.facebook.com/TheDailyReckoning">Daily Reckoning</a>. The Daily Reckoning, published by <a href="http://www.facebook.com/AgoraFinancial">Agora Financial</a> provides over 400,000 global readers economic news, market analysis, and contrarian investment ideas. </p>
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		<item>
		<title>Searching for Losses</title>
		<link>http://dailyreckoning.com/searching-for-losses/</link>
		<comments>http://dailyreckoning.com/searching-for-losses/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 22 Jun 2005 18:59:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>admin</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dailyreckoning.com/?p=11508</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&#34;I&#8217;m recommending put options on Google&#8230;&#34; my friend Porter Stansberry told me two weeks ago&#8230; &#34;So my readers can make triple-digit profits as shares fall back to earth.&#34; I replied, &#34;Okay, Porter&#8230; But isn&#8217;t that like standing in front of a freight train right now?&#34; It may be out of gas, he tells me. &#34;Steve, [...]<p><a href="http://dailyreckoning.com/searching-for-losses/">Searching for Losses</a> originally appeared in the <a href="http://www.facebook.com/TheDailyReckoning">Daily Reckoning</a>. The Daily Reckoning, published by <a href="http://www.facebook.com/AgoraFinancial">Agora Financial</a> provides over 400,000 global readers economic news, market analysis, and contrarian investment ideas. </p>
]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span class="Normal">&quot;I&#8217;m recommending put options on Google&#8230;&quot; my friend Porter Stansberry told me two weeks ago&#8230; &quot;So my readers can make triple-digit profits as shares fall back to earth.&quot; </span> <span class="Normal">I replied, &quot;Okay, Porter&#8230; But isn&#8217;t that like standing in front of a freight train right now?&quot;</span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">It may be out of gas, he tells me. &quot;Steve, a secret signal you showed me years ago, plus the activity in its options, tells me that we&#8217;ve seen the top in that stock&#8230;&quot;</span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">I can&#8217;t tell you the secret indicator. But I can share with you what the options trading in the world&#8217;s most widely used search engine may be telling us about where the stock price is headed&#8230;</span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">And I can show you how to track the options activity in the stocks you own, employing the put call ratio, to help determine when they might change directions on you.</span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">I find the chart below fascinating&#8230;</span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">The red line is our stock&#8217;s share price, while the blue line is the stock&#8217;s put call ratio for options.</span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">Simply said, when the blue line gets extremely high, it&#8217;s time for the stock to rally. And when the blue line gets extremely low, it&#8217;s time for the stock to crash.</span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">I&#8217;ll explain why in a minute. But first, take a look at the chart below&#8230; When the blue line peaked two years ago (at the beginning of this chart), shares of its stock jumped from $100 to $200 a share in no time. Now, today, the blue line is at all-time lows. Time for it to tank?</span></p>
<p><span class="Normal"><span class="Normal">The blue line on the above chart shows the trading volume in stock options. When the blue line is at a high extreme, everyone is betting our stock will crash. And of course, it&#8217;s then a great time to trade on the opposite outcome.</span> </span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">When the blue line is at a low extreme, everyone is betting on GOOG soaring. And chances are, the opposite will happen. The &quot;put call ratio,&quot; as it&#8217;s called, can be used as one gauge of investor sentiment. When the put call ratio reaches extremes in either direction, it can signal a turning point in the stock&#8217;s direction.</span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">The put call ratio is telling us that many more people are betting on shares of GOOG to rise rather than fall. Since &quot;the crowd&quot; now believes that the stock will rise, we may be at an extreme that signals a turning point: it may be time to go against the crowd.</span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">Another way to check out the extreme in optimism is to look at where these options traders have placed their bets. As I write, we&#8217;re talking in the area of $280 a share.</span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">Talk about optimism&#8230; As you can see from the chart below, there are many people betting on shares exceeding $380 a share, by mid-July! Now, that&#8217;s optimism! </span></p>
<div><span class="Normal"><span class="Normal">Put call ratios are far from perfect&#8230;</span> </span></div>
<p><span class="Normal"><span class="Normal">In fact, one friend of mine, Jason Goepfert of SentimenTrader.com, is fully aware of this. So he&#8217;s made a few &quot;tweaks&quot; to the classic put call ratios to make them more useful. He&#8217;s devising new put call indicators to specifically target what the &quot;dumb&quot; money is doing now&#8230;</span> </span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">For example, one of Jason&#8217;s indicators is his &quot;ROBO&quot; put call ratio. &quot;ROBO&quot; stands for &quot;retail-only, buy-only.&quot; Jason isolates the small options trades (trades of 10 contracts or less &#8211; &quot;retail only&quot;), and he only looks at people making &quot;buy&quot; orders (instead of short-selling options &#8211; &quot;buy only&quot;).</span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">This way, he figures, he&#8217;s getting at what the &quot;retail investor&quot; &#8211; the &quot;dumb&quot; money in the options market &#8211; is doing with his money.</span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">Jason&#8217;s ROBO stock put call ratio has accurately picked the major tops and bottoms. As Jason says in his description of the ROBO put call ratio on his web site:</span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">&quot;At the height of the stock market bubble, retail traders were going crazy over call options. For the week ended April 7, 2000, they bought to open 1,380,000 calls and only 237,000 puts, for a put call ratio of 0.17. They were so delirious with lust that they were willing to pay an average premium of $814 per call contract to be in the game. They paid an average of $599 at the time for their puts. So they were buying nearly six times as many calls as puts, and paying 36% more for the right to do so.&quot;</span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">&quot;At an opposite extreme, the week ended October 11, 2002, they bought to open 430,000 calls with an average premium of $182. During the same week, they bought 508,000 puts for an average of $250. So they were willing to pay 35% more for protection than they were for potential upside &#8211; the opposite of what they were doing during the bubble.&quot;</span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">When you&#8217;re trying to gauge the end of a move (in either direction) in a stock (or the overall market), put call ratios are a useful arrow in your quiver. They shouldn&#8217;t be used by themselves, but their message shouldn&#8217;t be ignored either.</span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">In summary, the put call ratios we use in our example today suggest GOOG may be &quot;over-loved&quot; and ripe for a fall. My friend Porter&#8217;s call might not be that crazy after all. Are your stocks ready for a fall, too? Find out&#8230;</span></p>
<div><span class="Normal"><span class="Normal"><strong>Did You Notice&#8230;?</strong><br />
</span> <span class="Normal">By Lord Rees-Mogg</span> </span></div>
<p><span class="Normal"><span class="Normal">The European Constitution was a shambles from the beginning&#8230; </span> </span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">There was no agreement on the issues that the Constitution should decide or the principles by which they were to be decided. The drafting was controlled by ex-President, Valery Giscard d’Estaing, from the top. Little or no attention was paid to proposals that did not come from the Franco-German group, which dominated the presidium. The result was a lengthy and confused document that made no contribution to democracy or efficiency, which had been the objectives of the Laeken agreement.</span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">The heads of governments all signed the treaty, supposed to be a second Treaty of Rome, in the summer of 2004. Those who avoided a referendum were able to get the treaty ratified in their parliaments, but only in Spain was it possible to win a referendum of the people at large. In France and the Netherlands, which were supposed to lead the way to ratification, a referendum produced a large “non” majority.</span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">Those of us who had been opposed to the Constitution from the beginning had felt that it was incoherent, undemocratic, and fatally opposed to the independence of the European nations. We were not surprised that it proved to be unacceptable, even to the founding nations of the European Union. Opinion polls suggest that it would have been rejected by the Germans if Germany had also had a referendum. </span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">In Britain, Prime Minister Tony Blair agreed to a referendum because he wanted to push the European issue beyond the general election. In that, he was successful, but he could not have won a referendum if one had eventually been held.</span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">From our point of view, the defeat of the Constitution in France and the Netherlands was, therefore, welcome. Yet I do not think that most of us expected to see Europe collapse into such a storm of recriminations.</span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">The British are blaming the French, and I think they are justified. The Constitution was a French affair, from beginning to end. The idea was pushed by the French; it was largely drafted by the French; an ex-president of France was in the chair; and the president of France decided to hold a referendum, and he lost it. </span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">In order to mitigate the political embarrassment, President Jacques Chirac then attacked the British rebate. He used a row over the European budget to cover his embarrassment over the Constitution. Tony Blair has responded by attacking France’s benefits under the Common Agricultural Policy.</span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">Europe has, of course, been through these internal disputes before, but this is a worse, and angrier, dispute than has occurred in a long time. Many observers feel, and the British hope, that it will lead to a looser Europe, more like a free trade area than a United States of Europe. It makes it much less likely that Turkey, which is not, after all, a European power, will be allowed to join.</span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">But the commission, the council of ministers, the parliament, and the European Court of Justice are all still there. So are the many “good Europeans” who believe in the “European project.” So is the euro &#8211; though that, too, is being questioned. The project of integration has suffered a setback, but it has not gone away, though the balance of probability has swung against it.</span></p>
<p><span class="Normal"><span class="Normal"><strong>And the Markets&#8230;</strong> </span> </span></p>
<table border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="500">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td width="187" valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal"> </span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td width="97" valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">Tuesday</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td width="96" valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">Monday</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td width="112" valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">This week</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td width="129" valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">Year-to-Date</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">DOW </span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">10,599 </span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">10,609 </span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">87</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">-1.7%</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">S&amp;P</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">1,214 </span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">1,216 </span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">16</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">0.1%</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">NASDAQ</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">2,091 </span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">2,088 </span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">28</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">-3.9%</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">10-year Treasury</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">4.05%</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">4.10%</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">0.00</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">-0.17</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">30-year Treasury</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">4.33%</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">4.38%</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">0.01</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">-0.49</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">Russell 2000</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">641 </span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">642 </span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">15</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">-1.6%</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">Gold</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">$438.70 </span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">$437.85 </span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">$11.65</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">0.3%</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">Silver</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">$7.29 </span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">$7.28 </span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">$0.03</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">7.0%</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">CRB</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">311.35 </span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">313.76 </span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">8.87</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">9.7%</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">WTI NYMEX CRUDE</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">$58.90 </span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">$59.37 </span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">$5.36</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">35.6%</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">Yen (YEN/USD)</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">JPY 108.26 </span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">JPY 109.39 </span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">0.38</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">-5.5%</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">Dollar (USD/EUR)</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">$1.2176 </span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">$1.2144 </span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">-57</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">10.2%</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">Dollar (USD/GBP)</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">$1.8290 </span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">$1.8233 </span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">-168</span> <span class="Normal"> </span></p>
</td>
<td valign="bottom">
<p align="center"><span class="Normal">4.7%</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p><a href="http://dailyreckoning.com/searching-for-losses/">Searching for Losses</a> originally appeared in the <a href="http://www.facebook.com/TheDailyReckoning">Daily Reckoning</a>. The Daily Reckoning, published by <a href="http://www.facebook.com/AgoraFinancial">Agora Financial</a> provides over 400,000 global readers economic news, market analysis, and contrarian investment ideas. </p>
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		<title>Gunning for a Church Stock</title>
		<link>http://dailyreckoning.com/gunning-for-a-church-stock/</link>
		<comments>http://dailyreckoning.com/gunning-for-a-church-stock/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 04 Aug 1999 19:05:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>admin</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Markets]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[church stocks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[sacred stocks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Steve Sjuggerud]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dailyreckoning.com/?p=12521</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[There are a few &#8220;sacred&#8221; stocks out there. From dinner parties to investment seminars, if you say something negative about one of these church stocks, people get incensed. They give you the same look smokers give you if you tell them &#8220;those things will kill you&#8221; right after they&#8217;ve taken a deep, gratifying puff. I&#8217;ve [...]<p><a href="http://dailyreckoning.com/gunning-for-a-church-stock/">Gunning for a Church Stock</a> originally appeared in the <a href="http://www.facebook.com/TheDailyReckoning">Daily Reckoning</a>. The Daily Reckoning, published by <a href="http://www.facebook.com/AgoraFinancial">Agora Financial</a> provides over 400,000 global readers economic news, market analysis, and contrarian investment ideas. </p>
]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span class="Normal">There are a few &#8220;sacred&#8221; stocks out there. From dinner parties to investment seminars, if you say </span><span class="Normal">something negative about one of these church stocks, people get incensed. They give you the </span><span class="Normal">same look smokers give you if you tell them &#8220;those things will kill you&#8221; right after they&#8217;ve taken a </span><span class="Normal">deep, gratifying puff. I&#8217;ve never been privy to the National Investment Club List of Church Stocks, </span><span class="Normal">but I&#8217;m sure its filled with names like Coke, GE, Wal-Mart, IBM, Intel, etc. A plea to the Church </span><span class="Normal">Stock Committee: Don&#8217;t let AOL on your sacred list! </span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">The time is right to short AOL. Virtually overnight, it&#8217;s shifted from its &#8220;customer first&#8221; focus that </span><span class="Normal">brought it fabulous success, to a horrible, backfiring &#8220;maintain market share at all costs&#8221; focus. </span><span class="Normal">They&#8217;ve forgotten the cardinal online rule &#8220;put your customer first, because he&#8217;s one click away </span><span class="Normal">from moving over to your competition.&#8221; </span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">The latest example of AOL wreaking havoc on its customers was last week, in the turf war </span><span class="Normal">against Microsoft in Instant Messaging. Everyone in the industry knows that Instant Messaging, </span><span class="Normal">which is basically email in &#8220;real-time,&#8221; will become as standard as email in the very near future. </span><span class="Normal">But AOL has been frustrating its Instant Messaging users as it fights the tide. </span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">But this battle is small. The real battle is over dial-up access. You see, AOL has a zillion PHONE </span><span class="Normal">access numbers to dial into AOL, but when it comes to CABLE access, the wave of the future, </span><span class="Normal">AOL has no way of forcing its users to come to AOL online. AT&amp;T spent over $100 billion </span><span class="Normal">developing its cable network to provide us with internet access that&#8217;s over 100 times faster than </span><span class="Normal">AOLs 56k connection. For it&#8217;s investment, AT&amp;T will win our business. </span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">The bigger problem for AOL is when everyone starts using cable service instead of their phone </span><span class="Normal">service for internet access, which is only about 3 years away. Here&#8217;s what will happen. You&#8217;ll </span><span class="Normal">pay your local CABLE company for fast internet access. Then you&#8217;ll quickly realize that you don&#8217;t </span><span class="Normal">need to keep paying for your AOL account anymore, and you will drop your AOL account. Simple </span><span class="Normal">as that. </span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">AOL realized this too late, after AT&amp;T was already on its cable buying spree. Once AOL realized </span><span class="Normal">this potentially fatal mistake, instead of trying to compete fairly, it went running to Big Government </span><span class="Normal">for help, saying that AOL and all ISPs should have &#8220;open access&#8221; to the cable. AT&amp;T correctly </span><span class="Normal">says that it only provides the cable connection, just like AOL provides the dial-up number, and the </span><span class="Normal">customer is free to go anywhere on the web, including AOL&#8217;s sites. </span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">Again, AT&amp;T wins. Not because its better or nicer than AOL. But because its in the best interest </span><span class="Normal">of the customer for AT&amp;T to win. And it sure doesn&#8217;t hurt to have the FCC Commissioner, William </span><span class="Normal">E. Kennard, on your side. He has repeatedly said that he is opposed to regulating open access </span><span class="Normal">because he wants AT&amp;T and other cable players to have every incentive to upgrade their </span><span class="Normal">networks. &#8221;My No. 1 concern, numero uno, is we&#8217;ve got to get Americans faster Internet access in </span><span class="Normal">their homes,&#8221; he says. </span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">So the news last week that 6 insiders sold a combined $400+ million worth of AOL stock, </span><span class="Normal">including a $162 million sale by AOL CEO Stephen Case, comes as no surprise. Let&#8217;s get this </span><span class="Normal">straight, last week,AOL insiders were dumping like mad, while AOL customers were becoming </span><span class="Normal">increasing frustrated with the Instant Messenger service. AOL&#8217;s protectionist policy in Instant </span><span class="Normal">Messenging and its cry for government help in cable access are both anti-competitive and anti-</span><span class="Normal">consumer. These policies will hurt AOL in the long run. We&#8217;re betting they&#8217;ll hurt in the short run as well. </span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">Sell AOL short. Use a very tight stop-loss of $102.50. If the shares close over $102.50, close out </span><span class="Normal">your short position the next day. A break down below $90 is only the beginning here. </span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">Steve Sjuggerud<br />
August 4, 1999</span></p>
<p><span class="Normal">Steve Sjuggerud is Research Director of the Oxford Club. To find out more about the Oxford </span><span class="Normal">Club, visit them at www.oxfordclub.com. </span></p>
<p><a href="http://dailyreckoning.com/gunning-for-a-church-stock/">Gunning for a Church Stock</a> originally appeared in the <a href="http://www.facebook.com/TheDailyReckoning">Daily Reckoning</a>. The Daily Reckoning, published by <a href="http://www.facebook.com/AgoraFinancial">Agora Financial</a> provides over 400,000 global readers economic news, market analysis, and contrarian investment ideas. </p>
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